impoverishe d associations of German workers, and an unpleasant assortment of autocratic and unscrupulou s Prussians. Russell, as usual, does not disguise where his sympathies lie.
Another hurdle, at least for the non-specialis t, is that the first chapter of German Social Democracy is far from easy going. It presupposes enough sophisticated economic theory to discourage anyone who is not convinced that he must find out what Marxism is about. And for most of this century most of us have not had that conviction. It is precisely here, I think, that Russell's genius is at work. For without any support from his intellectual environment or encourageme nt from specific individuals, Russell was motivated to do an enormous amount of reading, in both English and German, of many of the works of Marx available to him. And he saw immediately the theoretical significance and the immense social implications of the material before him. Unfortunatel y his audience was not prepared to understand his excitement. One indication of this is in the reviews the book received. It is apparent none of the reviewers knew eno,ugh about surplus value or Marx's theory of history to discuss these issues at the level ofRuss~Il's presentation . Less excusable, but compatible with this unfortunate result, was the absence, in the appropriate professional journals, of any response to the philosophical portions of the book. And that is the way it was going to be. Even sixty years later when Britain was to produce philosophers interested in Marx, they would write as if German Social Democracy had never been written. (I have in mind Lord Acton's The Illusion ofthe Epoch, 1955, and J. P. Plamenatz's German Marxism and Russian Communism, 1954. 1 ) What did Russell think of Marx way back in 1896? Of the Communist Manifesto he writes: "For terse eloquence, for biting wit, and for historical insight, it is, to my mind, one of the best pieces of political literature ever produced". 2 "In this magnificent work we have already all the epic force of the materialistic theory of history" (pp. 13-14) .
But his admiration for Marx's outrage, and for his sense of historical drama by no means blunts his critical faculties. He makes a number of important distinctions and objections which display a considered and confident command of the material at his disposal. I shall note a few of them.
I For an excellent, detailed study of the early history of British reactions to Marx, see Kirk Willis's "The Introduction and Critical Reception of Marxist Thought in Britain, 1850 -1900 " , HistoricalJourna l, 20 (1977 (d) Perhaps the most prescient, the most perceptive distinction Russell draws is between Marx's labour theory of value and his materialist theory of history. The two do not stand or fall together. It was a long time before others arrived at the same conclusion. What . makes this an especially remarkable combination of insight and detective work is the jumbled~up form in which Marx's ideas reach the reader, in particular the reader of eighty years ago who could not profit from advances in editorial procedure. Russell is strongly critical of Marx's labour theory of value. Very precisely and in some detail he itemizes its deficiencies from the standpoint of a version of the utility (supply-dem and) theory. What would be of interest would be for someone with the appropriate background in the history of economics to evaluate the originality of Russell's criticisms. Was he voicing standard objections current at the time, or were at least some of his criticisms original? His manner of exposition suggests he thought the latter. Certainly nowhere else is his knowledge of economic theory so vividly and consistently displayed.
With regard to Marx's theory of history, Russell is necessarily more circumspect since we are here within a world view of enormous proportions. He is obviously sceptical of historical inevitability, but he respects Marx's erudition, and finds himself in agreement on many specific issues (for instance the exploitative nature of the medieval Church). Russell is at a disadvantage here which was not present in his discussion of economic the()ry. There hehad a readyto-hand alternative to Marxian economics. But he is without a rival view to place beside Marx's theory of history. His Hegelian period does not seem to have included adherence to Hegel's philosophy of history, and the only other alternatives would have their source in religion. Probably his eventual position was that no theory of history was, in practice at least, feasible; all of them rested on too little evidence and too much romance.
Under these circumstances what I should like to do now is select two topics, religion and human labour, with a view to noting a few similarities and differences in the respective approaches of the two men.
Religion: By any ordinary standards both Russell and Marx were unbelievers. They were each convinced theology was, at the least, misplaced human effort and both men were extremely critical about the historical role of the Church in political and social affairs. But beyond this broad sense of agreement there are interesting differences of emphasis and elaboration.
Towards the end of his book on Leibniz Russell lays out in some detail his refutation of the traditional arguments supporting the existence of God. In many places he comments on the lack of evidence for immortality and other religious beliefs. He even gives us assessments of some major religious leaders. In all this activity he is concerned with a particular kind of truth, truth as conceived by the mathematician or physicist. And upon examination the alleged truths ofreligion turn out, he believes, to be factually false. As a good scientist he allows he could be wrong-hence, I presume, his preference for calling himself an agnostic rather than an atheist.
Marx, on the other hand, makes no attempt to refute the claims of religion in the customary philosophical sense. The question whether any of these claims might be true is never seriously raised. His premise is that were religion to be right, the world would be different. History has already refuted religion.
Towards the end of "Why I Am Not a Christian" Russell writes, "Religion is based, I think, primarily and mainly upon fear. It is partly the terror of the unknown and partly ... the wish to feel you have a kind of elder brother who will stand by you in all your troubles and disputes. Fear is the basis of the whole thing...."3 In this passage Russell is addressing a very Marxian kind of question. It might be phrased as follows: "Why is it that a body of false ideas can exert widespread, deep rooted influence over a very long stretch of time?" Usually, as in the passage just quoted, Russell responds to this question, as did Freud, at the psychological level. Marx could agree with this type of response, but he could not hold it to be sufficient. For him religion was an ideology, a set of false ideas systematically, though not necessarily consciously, used in the interest of the ruling 3 Why I Am Not a Christian (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 22.
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class by keeping the ruled class ignorant of their true condition. What most of us learn first about Marx on religion is that he said it was the opium of the people. It is useful to recall the lines that precede that phrase: "Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world and the soul of soulless circumstances. It is the opium of the people" . 4 Like real opium, religion puts people in a state of mind where they no longer think straight, and since they cannot think straight their capacity to act intelligently in response to their circumstances is correspondingly curtailed. And also, as in the case of real opium, the diffusion of religion is sanctioned and encouraged by those most likely to profit thereby.
Both Russell and Marx call for the passing away of religion. Referring to fear, which he has cited as the psychological source of religion, Russell writes, "Science can help us get over this craven fear in which mankind has lived for so many generations. Science can teach us .,. no longer to look around for imaginary supports, no longer to invent allies in the sky, but rather to look to our own efforts here below to make this world a fit place to live in instead ofthe sort of place that the churches in all these centuries have made it" (German Social Democracy, p. 22).
Marx shared Russell's early optimism as to the possibilities of science, and would have found it easy to agree with this passage. He himself puts the matter this way: "The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions about their condition is the demand to give up a condition which requires illusion" ("Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", p. 64). Russell, I believe, would agree. . Human Labour: If there is one cultural phenomenon more widespread and more fundamental than religion it is human labour. But few famous philosophers or theologians have written about it. Once one does inquire seriously into it one finds it becomes the basis of an entire social philosophy.
Russell and Marx both did take human labour seriously. Both were appalled by the forms it has taken throughout most of human history, and both regarded one aim of social analysis to suggest a new environment in which human labour can occur. s What I propose to do at this point is to outline the initial phase of the problem of human labour in a way I believe would be acceptable to each philosopher. I shall then adduce a few quotations designed to validate and enlarge upon the encompassing character of my outline. And finally I shall note why they differ as to the type of response the problem requires.
To survive we must satisfy certain primary needs. Since we are not Adam and Eve, our initial position is within a world wherein ways of coping with hunger, thirst, weather variations, etc., already exist. If we are to survive we must adopt these or new ways of coping. This pursuit envelops us; we may not notice, therefore, that the manner in which we obtain what is necessary to our existence concurrently shapes our existence. Put another way, since work involves sustaining ourselves biologically and socially, it would be wrong to say we work in order to live. Working (labouring) is living; the job is inseparable from its ambience.
It is through human labour that the goods and services of society are produced and distributed. Inevitably working involves entering into relations with others. These relations are basically relations of power which only later may be sanctioned by law as contractual relations. One way this power manifests itself is in the capacity of employers, owners, or controllers to answer, and to implement the answers to, a set of questions which determine in depth how the daily lives of subordinates are to be passed. High among such questions is: "What kind of work do we want done?" This will decide what kind of employment is available, and this in turn determines how subordinates will be able to satisfy their needs. Since Marx and the early Russell wrote, unions have arisen in some countries which sometimes have the interest of their members at heart. But if we consider the world at large, the owners or controllers usually have the power to determine how the tasks of the subordinates are to be organized. In so deciding they answer questions regarding how, when, and where a job will be done. They prescribe the required qualifications for employment, and determine the disposition of the product produced. Because of this imposed passivity subordinates live much of their lives by proxy. and embellishes upon Marxist claims. A beginning could be made by rereading pertinent passages from Roads to Freedom (1918 ), Freedom and Organization (1934 ), and Power (1938 , in addition to the works cited herein. Neglect of this topic surely springs in part from Russell's antipathy towards Lenin and the Russian revolution. But our eye should be on what Russell says about capital, class oppression, and related subjects, and not on his opinions of personalities and current events.
there is no physical or other compulsion, labour is avoided like the plague.... The external character of labour for the worker shows itself in the fact that it is not his own but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that he does not belong to himself in his labour but to someone else.... The result we arJ;'ive at then is that man (the worker) only feels himself freely active in his animal functions of eating, drinking, and procreating, at most also in his dwelling and dress, and feels himself an animal in his human functions. 8 We all know Russell and Marx responded differently to the problems posed in organizing human labour. What I have tried to suggest is that to a considerable degree they saw the problems in similar terms. In 1916 Russell thought capitalism could be contained, presumably by governmental restriction, and that a little capitalism could serve a useful purpose by keeping people on their toes. For Marx, capitalism is simply the most recent of a series of interlocking economic systems, one destined to self-destruct, but thereby giving birth to a society free ofexploitation, free ofscarcity, and free offear. I would be pleased to be able to agree with either of these scenarios since each contains an optimism about the future which I do not share. We have, I believe, come to the end of optimism. That does not mean pessimism must reign; we could, after all, have realism. But that is another story.
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